Get a key
Serves one credential of the organisation — references and metadata, never the key material — with its health, whether a connector is serving it; any other id is 404. Needs venue-keys:read or any venue-keys capability.
Authentication
Bearer authentication of the form Bearer <token>, where token is your auth token.
Path parameters
The record’s id — a positive 32-bit integer the platform minted.
The key’s id beneath the account — keyId on the account row’s keys[], credentialId on its own row; a key of another account is 404.
Headers
Your own id for the request: 8 to 128 of [A-Za-z0-9._-]. It becomes the request’s id and is echoed on the response. A value off that grammar is replaced with a fresh id, never refused.
Query parameters
latest (the default) shows a row’s pending proposal where one exists; approved shows what the platform enforces. Resources without proposals serve the same rows for both.
A position you hold — an X-Immix-Global-Sequence you read, or a 202’s commandGlobalSequence: this member answers only once it has folded the platform’s stream through it, waiting up to its deadline, then 503 PROJECTION_BEHIND with Retry-After. Within that stream a read is never older than what you have seen; drop your positions after an announced stream cut. A retry stating its 202’s position attaches to or replays that operation while the journal holds its key, never publishing twice. Stated once: one to nineteen digits, at most 9223372036854775807; else 400 MALFORMED_REQUEST.
Response
The credential’s row, rendered as the guide’s Reads section describes: the position header and body field, the ETag, money as decimal strings.
The account this key belongs to — connected with it or added beneath it, deleted with it.
The venue’s own allowlist, verbatim (IP addresses are not secrets); empty when none or no probe answered. At most 512 bytes (the connector clips what the venue said to that).
Who approved the row’s last proposal and when, in approval order — grown by each approval and kept on the concluded row as its record until the next proposal or a withdrawal clears it; empty until the first approval. The proposal concludes at the approval that meets the organisation’s count for the family as it stands then; pendingTransition says whether one is pending. a repeating group served as an array of objects, in the group’s own order; empty = no entries, never null
What the row’s last proposal proposed, kept once it concluded: the pending transition the conclusion cleared, as the register wrote it; NONE while it pends, or where none was. So the concluded row says what concluded, however its status has moved on since. NONE is the unset sentinel: outputs only — as input the field is required, and explicit NONE refuses 400. A consumer READING this field treats an unknown name as NONE, never as an error; as input an unknown name refuses 400 — the parse is strict
The position as a decimal string — the last change this member had applied, orders, balance readings and algo instances included.
The latest report from each connector role that serves this credential. It is observed, not decided: it changes without the row’s version moving, and it reads the same on both views. Judge each reading by its reportedAtNs: a serving connector restates its report on a heartbeat, so a time that stops advancing means nothing is reporting in that role any more.
The credential’s fingerprint as the intake computed it — fp- and the first 16 hex characters of SHA-256 over the canonical payload — the pin a connector adopts the material at: enough to prove a cutover, never enough to sign. Empty on a row seeded before the intake. At most 256 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
Why the last proposal was withdrawn, as the withdrawer stated it; empty-not-null.
Natural key — per-org unique among live credentials. At most 128 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
The probe’s allowlist verdict against the cluster’s egress set; UNKNOWN until a probe answers. UNKNOWN is the unset sentinel: outputs only — as input the field is required, and explicit UNKNOWN refuses 400. A consumer READING this field treats an unknown name as UNKNOWN, never as an error; as input an unknown name refuses 400 — the parse is strict
The fingerprint of the material the probe adopted — compare with keyFingerprint, the intake’s pin; empty until a probe answers. At most 256 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
The venue-facing key identifier the probing connector resolved (the public half, never the secret); empty until a probe answers. At most 256 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
The observed axis: the key scopes the venue stated to the probing connector, parsed by name; empty until a probe answers. An approval refuses a key short of a declared scope (SCOPE_INSUFFICIENT) or that can withdraw without canExecuteTransfers (SCOPE_MISMATCH); any other extra scope is recorded, not refused. a set (SBE bit-set) served as the array of its set choice names, each a KeyPermission, in declared order; empty = none set, never null; as input a repeated name refuses 400
Owner-stamped.
ACTIVATE, AMEND (capabilities/secretRef), ENABLE, DELETE or ROTATE; NONE otherwise. NONE is the unset sentinel: outputs only — as input the field is required, and explicit NONE refuses 400. A consumer READING this field treats an unknown name as NONE, never as an error; as input an unknown name refuses 400 — the parse is strict
The venue’s own permission string, verbatim (not a secret); empty until a probe answers. At most 512 bytes (the connector clips what the venue said to that).
Redacted diagnostic text for a non-NONE probe outcome; empty-not-null. At most 512 bytes (the connector clips what the venue said to that).
UNKNOWN = never probed; NONE = the venue’s key-restrictions read answered; else the probe’s own failure in the credential or gate band. UNKNOWN is the unset sentinel: outputs only — as input the field is required, and explicit UNKNOWN refuses 400. A consumer READING this field treats an unknown name as UNKNOWN, never as an error; as input an unknown name refuses 400 — the parse is strict
UNKNOWN is the unset sentinel: outputs only — as input the field is required, and explicit UNKNOWN refuses 400. A consumer READING this field treats an unknown name as UNKNOWN, never as an error; as input an unknown name refuses 400 — the parse is strict
The maker’s note on the pending proposal, for its approvers; empty-not-null. At most 256 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
UNKNOWN is the unset sentinel: outputs only — as input the field is required, and explicit UNKNOWN refuses 400. A consumer READING this field treats an unknown name as UNKNOWN, never as an error; as input an unknown name refuses 400 — the parse is strict
The venue’s account identifier behind the key (OKX uid); empty when the venue states none or no probe answered. At most 256 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
The venue’s identifier for the key — metadata, not material. At most 256 bytes; longer refuses INVALID_FIELD.
Whether the key may execute transfers. a boolean; absent reads false
Whether the key may read balances. a boolean; absent reads false
Whether the key may serve deposit addresses. a boolean; absent reads false
Capability boolean: an order on the key’s account routes through the account’s trading key — the one key beneath it that carries this, ACTIVE. a boolean; absent reads false
Platform time the row’s last proposal concluded; 0 while it is pending, or when the row never carried one. A write the organisation’s count let through at once concludes in the maker’s own fact: equal to proposedAtNs. int64 as a decimal JSON string
Who concluded the row’s last proposal: the approver whose approval met the organisation’s count, or the maker when the count was 0 and the write concluded at once; null while it is pending, or when the row never carried one. an actor: an object {kind, id}; null where none is stated
The refdata exchange for an EXCHANGE-kind credential — carried, not resolved here; a credential that can trade must name one (MISSING_VENUE); 0 = no venue.
Key metadata: when the venue key was minted; 0 = not stated. int64 as a decimal JSON string
When an API key made the row’s last proposal, the member the key’s secret had last been answered to as it proposed — its last rotator then, else its issuer — kept on the concluded row with proposedBy; null when a member made the proposal, or the row never carried one. The proposal counts as this member’s and the key’s issuer’s, whoever rotates the key afterwards: neither may approve it (SELF_APPROVAL). an actor: an object {kind, id}; null where none is stated
Platform time of that withdrawal; 0 when none was. The three fields and lastWithdrawalReason stand until the next proposal replaces them. int64 as a decimal JSON string
Who made the last proposal that was withdrawn; null when none was. an actor: an object {kind, id}; null where none is stated
Who withdrew it — the proposer, or a checker returning it; null when none was. an actor: an object {kind, id}; null where none is stated
The key creation time the venue stated to the probe; 0 = the venue states none, or never probed. int64 as a decimal JSON string
Consensus time of the probe report this row records — owner-stamped; 0 = never probed. int64 as a decimal JSON string
Platform time the row’s last proposal was made, kept on the concluded row; 0 when the row never carried one. int64 as a decimal JSON string
Who made the row’s last proposal — kept on the concluded row as its record; null when the row never carried one (a row a connector or the platform landed). pendingTransition says whether that proposal is still pending. an actor: an object {kind, id}; null where none is stated
Governance deadline for rotation; a breach is an ops alert; 0 = none. int64 as a decimal JSON string
TRUE = the probe answered but its venue serves no read of the key’s own scope (Binance Demo Mode has no /sapi), so observedPermissions is empty because nothing stated it — the approval’s scope edges are not applied, and the row says so. FALSE (the fail-safe decode) = the scope, as observed, is the venue’s word and is judged. a boolean; absent reads false